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INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps by now it’s all academic. Several commentators insist 
that we don’t know it yet, but technology irrevocably gutted any 
normative semblance of privacy.1 Indeed, history provides no 
analogue to the Information Age; never before has so much data been 
so easily accessible by so many. At 4.1 billion people, over half the 
 
            *  Associate Professor, Concordia University School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., Ira Bloom, Freedom of Information Laws in the Digital Age: 
The Death Knell of Informational Privacy, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (2006) 
(claiming that “the privacy protective consequences of practical obscurity have been 
obliterated because [of] the extensive use and availability of information in electronic, 
digital databases”); James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Informational 
Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 67 (2003) (noting that “[s]o much information about us 
is already in government and private sector databases that it may be too late to rethink 
our approach to information privacy protection”); David Alan Sklansky, Too Much 
Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1069, 1085 (2014) (noting academic concern that privacy is dead). 
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world’s population use the Internet.2 Two-thirds of the world’s 7.6 
billion inhabitants have a mobile phone.3 The world’s digital content 
reduced to a stack of books would tower from Earth to Pluto ten times.4 
With all of this readily accessible information, how can private, 
personal information remain private and personal? This Article posits 
that under current legal protocols, it can’t. Data brokers already house 
voluminous files on almost every consumer, and data collection 
increases by orders of magnitude. As detailed in Part I, everyday 
objects, outfitted with sensors and connected to the Internet, capture 
and record data exhaust.5 The Internet of Things monitors and 
transmits seemingly innocuous information generated simply by 
living, by moving from one place to another. Whether at home, in 
transit, or at work, the magnificent, the mundane, and the miniscule 
are all recorded.6  
In isolation, pervasive data collection arguably poses small 
privacy risk. If data points are disperse and unconnected, anonymity 
is plausible. But industry players in social media, Internet services, 
and ecommerce are large and sophisticated. They have long 
recognized the monetary benefit inherent in consumer information. 
The ongoing collection of consumer data by these entities, however, 
is arguably muted by the services they offer. Data collection, the 
argument goes, improves the services rendered.  
Data brokers, by contrast, more plainly reveal the magnitude of 
privacy risk. Part II details the rise of the data broker industry, its 
shrouded and profitable nature, and the largely unregulated landscape 
 
 2. Simon Kemp, Digital in 2018: World’s Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion 
Mark, WE ARE SOCIAL BLOG (Jan. 30, 2018), https://wearesocial.com/blog/ 
2018/01/global-digital-report-2018 [https://perma.cc/BDA4-VC8R] (indicating that 
nearly a quarter of a billion new users came online for the first time in 2017). 
 3. Id.  
 4. See Richard Wray, Internet Data Heads for 500bn Gigabytes, GUARDIAN 
(May 18, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/may/18/digital-content-
expansion [https://perma.cc/8XLP-ZABN]; see also Kiley M. Belliveau, Leigh Ellen 
Gray & Rebecca J. Wilson, Busting the Black Box: Big Data Employment and 
Privacy, 84 DEF. COUNS. J. 1, 4 (2017) (“[F]or as much data as people create—for 
example, an average of 500 million photos per day and over 200 hours of video per 
minute shared in 2014—that volume is nothing compared with the amount of digital 
information created about them each day.”).  
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. See, e.g., Dave Evans, The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of 
the Internet is Changing Everything, CISCO, Apr. 2011, at 2 (defining the Internet of 
Things as “the point in time when more ‘things or objects’ [are] connected to the 
Internet than people”).  
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in which it operates.7 The privacy harms implicit in the collection and 
categorization of voluminous files on almost every user, while latent, 
are severe. Very little protects users from complete exposure, as data 
brokers can sell sensitive, stereotyped, and comprehensive personal 
information without accountability. 
Legal regulations, both in the U.S. and the E.U., have proved 
ineffectual. Part III reveals how these laws emerged by accretion.8 
They built upon previous legal constructs that predated the Internet, 
the Internet of Things, and the borderless flow of data in the digital 
age. They rely largely on providing notice and consent and fail to 
account for data collection that occurs without the possibility of notice 
and consent. They ignore the porous architecture of the web, which 
allows “protected” data to be captured when published by a host of 
unrestricted sources.  
Into this void, many, from government officials, to free-market 
proponents, to legal scholars, have offered solutions. Part IV reviews 
a panoply of regulatory fixes and finds them wanting.9 The diffuse and 
borderless nature of digital data requires a regulatory scheme 
fundamentally different from these proposals. Part V argues that the 
risk of ubiquitous exposure is a societal risk, not an individual one.10 
Injuries stemming from collection and misuse of personal data, if 
characterized as societal rather than individual, prompt legal reform 
distinct from the current regime and from the proposals posited by 
government officials, experts, and academics.  
Societal harms, like environmental or healthcare harms, warrant 
proscriptive government involvement that emphasizes prevention 
over post-injury punishment. To forestall societal harms, government 
agencies prescribe regulatory norms, supervise their implementation, 
audit industry players, investigate potential infractions, and prosecute 
violators. The Article proposes a federal agency tasked with data 
privacy protection and bounded by risk of harm. Before promulgating 
a regulation, the agency must first identify the likelihood of the 
privacy risk in conjunction with the gravity of the harm balanced 
against the benefit to society absent regulation.  
Given the enormity of readily accessible personal information 
and the ever-increasing sources from which the information can be 
 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
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harvested, data privacy is no longer an individual risk; it is a societal 
one. It merits societal protection. Otherwise, we are all exposed. 
I. THE UBIQUITY OF DATA COLLECTION 
Facebook users have uploaded well over 250 billion photographs 
to the site.11 Google processes and records over 40,000 search queries 
every second.12 The first YouTube video was uploaded in April 2005; 
today, 300 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute.13 
More than 3 billion people use social media each month,14 with the 
average Internet user spending around 6 hours each day—roughly 
one-third of his or her waking life—using Internet-powered devices 
and services.15 Applied to 4.1 billion Internet users, humanity is 
projected to spend 1 billion years online in 2018.16 The amount of 
readily accessible personal information is overwhelming. 
A lot of personal information is voluntarily disseminated. Take 
for example a user who uploads a photograph of a birthday celebration 
to social media. The user intends a singular purpose—to communicate 
the event to specific other users. If that were the only use of the 
information, it would be difficult to call it private due to its voluntary 
relinquishment. But the information is not quarantined to a singular 
use; instead it is often categorized, copied, sold, and used in ways not 
anticipated by the user.17  
 
 11. Natasha Kohne & Kamran Salour, Biometric Privacy Litigation: Is 
Unique Personally Identifying Information Obtained from A Photograph Biometric 
Information?, 25 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIVACY SECTION ST. B. CAL. 
150, 150 (2016). 
 12. Harsh, How Much Data Does Google Handle??, WP FORMERS (June 4, 
2017), https://www.wpformers.com/google-datacenter-capacity/ [https://perma.cc/ 
PA6C-UWBT]. 
 13. 37 Mind Blowing YouTube Facts, Figures and Statistics – 2019, 
MERCHDOPE (Jan. 5, 2019), https://merchdope.com/youtube-statistics/ 
[https://perma.cc/RWX3-RKZV].  
 14. 15 Best Vlogging Cameras for YouTube 2018, MERCHDOPE (July 30, 
2018), https://merchdope.com/youtube-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/Z6ZE-ACV5].  
 15. See Saima Salin, More Than Six Hours of Our Day is Spent Online – 
Digital 2019 Reports, DIG. INFO. WORLD (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.digitalinformationworld.com/2019/02/internet-users-spend-more-than-
a-quarter-of-their-lives-online.html [https://perma.cc/N3DE-LSQ2].  
 16. Internet Stats & Facts for 2019, HOSTING FACTS (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://hostingfacts.com/internet-facts-stats/ [https://perma.cc/9XEM-44ZJ].  
 17. See, e.g., Samantha L. Miller, The Facebook Frontier: Responding to the 
Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 541 (2008–2009) 
(describing a Facebook user who was blackmailed using pictures she uploaded and 
thought were “private”).  
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If maintaining privacy over voluntarily divulged content is 
difficult, achieving meaningful privacy over content collected without 
user awareness approaches the impossible. Just by moving from one 
place to another, we exude data exhaust.18 Everyday items equipped 
with sensors collect our data without our knowing it.19 These 
previously inert objects are proliferating, with over 220 billion 
worldwide expected by 2020.20 In a world where “pretty much 
everything you can imagine will wake up,” keeping our privacy is 
more unlikely than ever.21 Even in the infancy of the Internet of 
Things, “passive” data is being collected at home, in transit, at play, 
and at work.22 
A. The Internet of Things at Home 
At home, the Internet of Things increasingly harvests passively 
generated data.23 Users control the interior and exterior functions of 
the home through apps and devices communicating with 
Internet-equipped objects.24 The washing machine, outfitted with 
sensors connected to the Internet, alerts the user that the spin cycle is 
over and that more detergent is required.25 The thermostat monitors 
when the home is occupied to ensure proper air conditioning.26 
 
 18. See, e.g., Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 205, 207–08 (2012). 
 19. See id. (noting the “mind-boggling quantities of personal data” that are 
“collected every time we use our iPhones, tablets, and other gadgets” and that 
“companies have increasing access to our data exhaust—data detailing what we have 
looked at, where we have been”).  
 20. Melissa W. Bailey, Seduction by Technology: Why Consumers Opt Out 
of Privacy by Buying into the Internet of Things, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2016). 
Others expect that number to increase to trillions within the next decade. See FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD 
1 (2015). 
 21. What Is the Internet of Everything?, CISCO, https://www.cisco.com/c/m/ 
en_za/tomorrow-starts-here/ioe.html [https://perma.cc/7LHK-M4LM] (last visited 
May 24, 2019). 
 22. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, at 14 (noting that 10,000 homes 
using the Internet of Things “generate 150 million discrete data points a day or 
approximately one data point every six seconds for each household”). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. at 1–2. 
 25. See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the 
Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 436 (2018). 
 26. See Marcus Wohlsen, What Google Really Gets Out of Buying Nest for 
$3.2 Billion, WIRED (Jan. 14, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/01/ 
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Algorithms continually process home occupancy data to predict future 
occupancy.27 Often the predictive function is not based on a single 
home but leverages occupancy patterns of thousands of users with the 
same thermostat technology.28  
Manufacturers engraft sensors into lightbulbs,29 toothbrushes,30 
doorbells,31 garage doors,32 sprinkler systems,33 and slow-cookers34—
most of which monitor, collect, and transmit the occupant’s data 
exhaust.35 Onesies and crib sheets collect and transmit data about 
infant movement, sleeping patterns, and skin temperature.36 Pill bottles 
uploaded with daily dosage regimens notify users when to take 
prescribed medication.37 Toothbrushes transmit brushing behavior to 
 
googles-3-billion-nest-buy-finally-make-internet-things-real-us/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4JH9-9CCF].  
 27. See id. (discussing how, as the devices talk to each other, they construct 
an aggregate picture of human behavior and predict or anticipate what users want 
before they know it). 
 28. See id. (“Over time, as the Nest Learning Thermostat uses its sensors to 
train itself according to your comings and goings, the entire network of Nests in homes 
across the country becomes smarter.”). 
 29. See Richard M. Martinez, The Internet of Things: Privacy Issues in a 
Connected World Remarks Given at Protecting Virtual You: Individual and 
Informational Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 11 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
63, 63 (2017).  
 30. See Tim Clark, At Mobile World Congress, A Connected Future Becomes 
Reality, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2004, 3:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/        
2014/02/27/at-mobile-world-congress-a-connected-future-becomes-reality/#611716 
9289fc [https://perma.cc/CYW2-5DHF]. 
 31. See Kathryn McMahon, Tell the Smart House to Mind Its Own Business!: 
Maintaining Privacy and Security in the Era of Smart Devices, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2511, 2518 (2018).  
 32. See Terrell McSweeny, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at 
TecNation 2016 (Sept. 20, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/documents/public_statements/985773/mcsweeny_-_tecnation_2016_9-
20-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3V5-QPUX]). 
 33. See Andrew Gebhart, 6 Reasons You Need a Smart Sprinkler, CNET (July 
11, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/6-reasons-you-need-a-smart-
sprinkler/ [https://perma.cc/E86N-NGMB].  
 34. See Robert L. Mitchell, The Internet of Things at Home: 14 Smart 
Products that Could Change Your Life, COMPUTERWORLD (June 30, 2014, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2474727/consumerization-of-it/ 
consumerization-150407-the-internet-of-things.html [https://perma.cc/VR2N-4LD6].  
 35. See McMahon, supra note 31, at 2518. 
 36. See Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other 
People’s Things, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 639, 642–43 (2015). 
 37. DAVID ROSE, ENCHANTED OBJECTS: DESIGN, HUMAN DESIRE, AND THE 
INTERNET OF THINGS 8–9 (2014). 
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the user’s dentist.38 Several companies sell processing hubs that 
amalgamate diverse home sensors into a central locus.39  
The amount of data collected by previously inert household 
objects raises sensitive questions unaddressed by the law. Who owns 
the data? The data exhaust generated in the home, especially when 
combined with other data gathered from the Internet, transforms a 
smart home into a glass home. As one commentator notes: 
The problem we currently face is thus not merely that a vast amount of 
information is resting in databases, but that we have very little control over 
that information—how it is used, shared, and manipulated—once it is “out 
there.” We are at the mercy of those who hold our data.40 
Data from the thermostat alone reveals when the user has been 
away from the home historically and when the user likely will be away 
from home in the future.41 From medical needs to sleeping patterns 
and television use, sensors in the home track and record granular 
details of the occupant’s life.42 More often than not, the data is not 
held, and therefore not controlled, by the user; it is controlled by the 
entity that captured it.43 
Companies that manufacture Internet-enabled washing 
machines, thermostats, and baby monitors scrutinize the data 
generated by their products.44 Analyzing user behavior can lead to 
 
 38. See Clark, supra note 30. 
 39. See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Hybrid Transactions and the Internet of Things: 
Goods, Services, or Software?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77, 84 (2017) (discussing the 
detriments attending smart home hubs).   
 40. Nehf, supra note 1, at 3. 
 41. Wohlsen, supra note 26; Elvy, Hybrid Transactions, supra note 39, at 
96–97. 
 42. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, at 11 (“If smart televisions or other 
devices store sensitive financial account information, passwords, and other types of 
information, unauthorized persons could exploit vulnerabilities to facilitate identity 
theft or fraud.”).  
 43. Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data, supra note 25, at 440 (“Privacy 
policies routinely authorize companies to disclose, sell, and transfer consumer data to 
third parties.”). 
 44. See Paige Leuschner, Are We There Yet? Current State of the Smart 
Home Market, EURACTIV (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/ 
opinion/are-we-there-yet-current-state-of-the-smart-home-market/ [https://perma.cc/ 
CUY7-9EE3]. Smart-home solutions provide the framework that enables companies 
to learn more about their customers, which means they can sell more services more 
effectively, retain more customers, and ultimately generate more revenue in an 
increasingly challenging and competitive business climate. See id.  
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product improvement.45 But the original reason for collecting such 
data does not define its value.46 In light of current data processing 
technologies, once the data has been collected and stored, it can be 
used for a variety of purposes unconnected to the original purpose 
associated with its collection.47 As a result, companies often transfer 
the data to third parties.48  
Granular data captured by household objects is not only 
valuable; it is also vulnerable.49 Manufacturers of Internet-enabled 
objects overproduce the software that enables data collection and 
underproduce the safety mechanisms required to protect it.50 The 
primary goal of enabling a pill bottle to connect with the Internet in 
order to dispense medication overshadows the secondary concern of 
securing sensitive data from unauthorized access.51 Often the device 
itself, like a sensor grafted to a toothbrush, is so small that the 
hardware required to secure the data appears cost prohibitive.52 
 
 45. See id. For example, British Gas is using the data it collects from devices 
deployed in the home to populate its MyEnergy app with personalized energy 
consumption information. See id.  
 46. See Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 707, 711 (1987). 
 47. See Leuschner, supra note 44.   
 48. See Natasha Singer & Jeremy B. Merrill, When a Company is Put Up for 
Sale, in Many Cases, Your Personal Data Is, Too, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/technology/when-a-company-goes-up-for-
sale-in-many-cases-so-does-your-personal-data.html [https://perma.cc/7GKU-
QQRF]  (reporting that privacy policies in 85 of the “top 100 websites in the United 
States” had “terms of service or privacy policies” that authorize the sale of consumer 
data in the event of “a merger, acquisition, bankruptcy, asset sale or other [business] 
transaction”). 
 49. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, at 11 (noting that “as consumers 
install more smart devices in their homes, they may increase the number of 
vulnerabilities an intruder could use to compromise personal information”).  
 50. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps 
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
85, 134 (2014) (noting Internet-enabled products “are often manufactured by 
traditional consumer-goods makers rather than computer hardware or software 
firms”).  
 51. See Brian Fung, Here’s the Scariest Part About the Internet of Things, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/11/19/heres-the-scariest-part-about-the-internet-of-things/ 
[https://perma.cc/9ME3-2CAE] (“Although the folks who make dishwashers may be 
fantastic engineers, or even great computer programmers, it doesn’t necessarily imply 
they’re equipped to protect Internet users from the outset.”). 
 52. See Brian Krebs, The Lingering Mess from Default Insecurity, KREBS ON 
SECURITY (Nov. 12, 2015), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/11/the-lingering-mess-
from-default-insecurity/ [https://perma.cc/UY39-AX3P] (“As the Internet of Things 
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Moreover, connected devices frequently communicate among several 
devices in a consumer’s home.53 As a result, “the least secure device 
becomes the security level for all [of a consumer’s] devices.”54 
These vulnerabilities are now manifesting.55 In one case, 
activation of Internet-enabled lightbulbs required access to the user’s 
Web ID and network passwords.56 To allow easy installment of 
multiple lightbulbs, the passwords were automatically shared when a 
new lightbulb was activated, allowing hackers to access the passwords 
by pretending to be a lightbulb.57 In another instance, a smart kettle 
leaked data to a random server in Iceland.58 In 2015, researchers 
revealed that an Internet-enabled Barbie doll automatically connected 
to unsecured WiFi networks, allowing unknown parties to 
communicate directly with the unsuspecting child.59  
Of course the connected home is more than just household 
objects outfitted with sensors.60 Smart electrical meters are replacing 
stand-alone meters, for example.61 Smart meters monitor and 
 
grows, we can scarcely afford a massive glut of things that are insecure-by-design. 
One reason is that this stuff has far too long a half-life, and it will remain in our 
Internet’s land and streams for many years to come . . . . Mass-deployed, insecure-by-
default devices are difficult and expensive to clean up and/or harden for security, and 
the costs of that vulnerability are felt across the Internet and around the globe.”). 
 53. See Sarah Kellogg, Every Breath You Take: Data Privacy and Your 
Wearable Fitness Device, 72 J. MO. B. 76, 78 (2016). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Stuart Nathan, Safer Connections: Reducing the Security Risks 
of the Internet of Things, ENGINEER (May 14, 2018), https://www.theengineer.co.uk/ 
iot-security-risks/ [https://perma.cc/9S89-9BVS]. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id.  
 59. See Rebecca Smithers, Strangers Can Talk to Your Child Through 
“Connected” Toys, Investigation Finds, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2017, 3:46 AM),  
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/nov/14/retailers-urged-to-withdraw-
toys-that-allow-hackers-to-talk-to-children [https://perma.cc/ND2S-HZJG].  
 60. See Leuschner, supra note 44. For the most part, today’s smart homes 
consist of individual connected devices with “interoperability issues, including a lack 
of communication between devices due to numerous communicating technologies, 
standards, and protocols.” Id. The smart home of the near future will “act intuitively 
and automatically, anticipating and responding” to the occupants’ needs based on 
“learned lifestyle patterns and real-time interaction.” Id.  
 61. See Nearly Half of All U.S. Electricity Customers Have Smart Meters, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 
detail.php?id=34012 [https://perma.cc/S3XJ-3UMN] (“Installations of smart meters 
have more than doubled since 2010—almost half of all U.S. electricity customer 
accounts now have smart meters. By the end of 2016, U.S. electric utilities had 
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immediately transmit electrical use, obviating the need to hire utility 
employees to periodically check stand-alone meters.62 While more 
efficient and more precise, smart meters record much more than that 
needed for billing.63 They gather fine-grain data.64 Electrical devices 
have unique signatures such that metering can “distinguish the 
microwave from the refrigerator, or even the light bulb in the 
bathroom from the light bulb in the dining room.”65  
In 2014, the White House released a report detailing its privacy 
concerns and noting that smart meters “show when you move about 
your house.”66 Others have been more direct, showing that data from 
smart meters can reveal the occupant’s relative wealth, cleanliness, 
and medical health, in addition to when the occupant is home, cooking, 
showering, and watching television.67 One study identified the exact 
television show being watched solely from the home’s electrical 
signal.68 These demonstrations suggest that occupants of homes 
connected to smart meters unwittingly divulge a consistent stream of 
 
installed about 71 million advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) smart meters, 
covering 47% of the 150 million electricity customers in the United States.”).  
 62. See Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 199, 211 (2011). 
 63. See Matt Liebowitz, Smart Electricity Meters Can Be Used to Spy on 
Private Homes, NBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/ 
45946984/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/smart-electricity-meters-can-be-
used-spy-private-homes [https://perma.cc/6PBU-RJGN].  
 64. See id.; see also Lorraine Bailey, Seventh Circuit Hears Privacy Case 
Over Smart Meters, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.courthousenews.com/seventh-circuit-hears-privacy-case-over-smart-
meters/ [https://perma.cc/U26F-L6HJ] (claiming that city government violates the 
Fourth Amendment by granular electric data collection through smart meters, which 
allows “the city to determine when a resident is using their oven or electric water 
kettle”).  
 65. Patrick Thibodeau, The Internet of Things Could Encroach on Personal 
Privacy, COMPUTERWORLD (May 3, 2014), https://www.computerworld.com/article/ 
2488949/the-internet-of-things-could-encroach-on-personal-privacy.html [https:// 
perma.cc/A39S-R7DA]. 
 66. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, 
PRESERVING VALUES 53–54 (2014). 
 67. See Liebowitz, supra note 63. 
 68. See MIRO ENEV ET AL., INFERRING TV CONTENT FROM ELECTRICAL NOISE 
1 (2010); see also Chester Wisniewski, Smart Meter Hacking Can Disclose Which TV 
Shows and Movies You Watch, NAKED SECURITY (Jan. 8, 2012), https://nakedsecurity. 
sophos.com/2012/01/08/28c3-smart-meter-hacking-can-disclose-which-tv-shows-
and-movies-you-watch/ [https://perma.cc/L4P3-6R99].  
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detailed personal information, the after-collection uses of which are 
largely unregulated.69 
Digital assistants, like Amazon’s Alexa, collect even more data 
from within the home. Amazon and Google, the leading sellers of such 
devices, say the digital assistants record and process audio only after 
users trigger them by pushing a button or uttering a phrase like “Hey, 
Alexa” or “Okay, Google.”70 This is not always true, as one family’s 
conversation was recorded without prompting and then sent to a 
random person in their contacts.71 Assuming such instances are 
aberrations, both Google and Amazon still record and analyze every 
overt request a user makes.72 Users can delete their history of Alexa 
requests, but the default setting records each query.73 Amazon claims 
that the query history improves Alexa’s responsiveness, which is 
certainly true, but the privacy policy Amazon offers enables the 
company to use the user’s query history in other ways and to share it 
with third parties.74  
Both Amazon and Google have sought patents for technology 
that would allow digital assistants to monitor more than discrete 
 
 69. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., AGENDA ID NO. 
10870, PROPOSED DECISION OF COMM’R PEEVEY at 40 (2011) (establishing opt out 
procedures for smart meters). 
 70. See Dacia Green, Big Brother is Listening to You: Digital Eavesdropping 
in the Advertising Industry, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 352, 357 (2018).  
 71. See Hamza Shaban, An Amazon Echo Recorded a Family’s 
Conversation, Then Sent It to a Random Person in Their Contacts, Report Says, 
WASH. POST (May 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2018/05/24/an-amazon-echo-recorded-a-familys-conversation-then-sent-
it-to-a-random-person-in-their-contacts-report-says/?noredirect=on&utm_term= 
.bf4f5c44baa4 [https://perma.cc/7K5B-2EB4]. 
 72. See Jing Cao & Dina Bass, Why Google, Microsoft and Amazon Love the 
Sound of Your Voice, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-13/why-google-microsoft-and-amazon-love-
the-sound-of-your-voice [https://perma.cc/Q9LS-Y86Q]; see also Tim Moynihan, 
Alexa and Google Home Record What You Say. But What Happens to That Data?, 
WIRED (Dec. 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/alexa-and-google-
record-your-voice/ [https://perma.cc/S4T7-ELDL].  
 73. See Moynihan, supra note 72.  
 74. See Alexa Internet Privacy Notice, ALEXA (2018), https://www.alexa. 
com/help/privacy [https://perma.cc/5T4K-U73M] (“As we continue to develop our 
business, we might sell or buy subsidiaries or business units. In such transactions, user 
information generally is one of the transferred business assets but remains subject to 
the promises made in any pre-existing privacy notice (unless, of course, the user 
consents otherwise). Also, in the event that Alexa or substantially all of its assets are 
acquired, user information will of course be one of the transferred assets.”). 
386 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
auditory queries.75 One patent application includes “[a] system for 
deriving sentiments and behaviors from ambient speech, even when a 
user has not addressed the device with its ‘wakeword.’”76 The system 
would monitor audio from a collection of devices, like tablets and e-
readers, listening for words like “love,” “bought,” or “dislike” and 
analyzing the conversation in real time.77 One Google patent 
application states that voices could be used to determine a speaker’s 
mood using the “volume of the user’s voice, detected breathing rate, 
crying and so forth” and a speaker’s medical condition “based on 
detected coughing, sneezing and so forth.”78  
As more household objects wake up, more data exhaust is 
recorded. Without a regulatory structure in place, the entities that 
capture the data control it.79 Leveraging the “rich, accurate, and 
fine-grain” sensor data gathered by the Internet of Things, private 
companies, government agencies, and individuals can make powerful 
inferences about users’ personalities and habits.80 Through licensing 
and user agreements, some entities promise privacy generally while 
carving out exceptions for sale and transfer to third parties.81 These 
issues associated with the Internet of Things are not relegated to the 
home, of course. Stepping from the home and heading to work exposes 
the user to a new landscape of monitoring through the Internet of 
Things.82  
 
 75. See AMAZON PATENT FILINGS REVEAL DIGITAL HOME ASSISTANT 
PRIVACY PROBLEMS, CONSUMER WATCHDOG 1 (2017). 
 76. Id. (emphasis omitted).  
 77. Id. at 6. 
 78. Sapna Maheshwari, Hey, Alexa, What Can You Hear? And What Will You 
Do With It?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/ 
business/media/amazon-google-privacy-digital-assistants.html [https://perma.cc/ 
ZEV5-FSY4]. 
 79. See Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data, supra note 25, at 440. 
 80. Alexander H. Tran, The Internet of Things and Potential Remedies in 
Privacy Tort Law, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 263, 270 (2017). 
 81. See Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data, supra note 25, at 439–46 
(reviewing privacy policies that attend a range of Internet of Things devices and 
revealing that many policies expressly allow the company to sell or transfer consumer 
data in connection with a “business transition”). 
 82. See id. at 439–46. 
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B. The Internet of Things in Transit 
Once a symbol of individualism and escapism, the modern car 
now monitors almost everything that transpires within it.83 Integrated 
systems record location, speed, acceleration, entertainment, occupant 
identity, contact lists, and much more.84 With over 380 million 
“connected” cars by 2021, “[t]he market position of the car today is 
similar to where the smartphone was in 2010.”85 
Event Data Recorders, sometimes called “black boxes,” log and 
retain particular driving data in most cars sold in the U.S. in the past 
twenty-five years.86 Black boxes typically record only a sliver of 
driving data—that which immediately precedes a collision or sudden 
braking like speed, braking, and seatbelt use.87 Although black boxes 
have been around for decades, Congress moved to protect black box 
data only recently in 2015 by restricting generalized access and 
guaranteeing that the data belongs to the owner or lessee of the 
vehicle.88 
But the modern car contains much more than a black box.89 Over 
90% of cars sold by 2020 will have the capacity to connect to the 
Internet.90 “Infotainment” systems record location data, location 
history, telephone calls, texts, navigational queries, and restaurant 
 
 83. See John R. Quain, Cars Suck Up Data About You. Where Does It All 
Go?, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/ 
automobiles/wheels/car-data-tracking.html [https://perma.cc/Y3P4-YCSU]. 
 84. See id. 
 85. John Greenough, The Connected Car Report: Forecasts, Competing 
Technologies, and Leading Manufacturers, BUS. INSIDER (June 10, 2016, 5:33 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/connected-car-forecasts-top-manufacturers-leading-
car-makers-2015-3 [https://perma.cc/WHN4-RZ6B].  
 86. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FINAL REGULATORY 
EVALUATION: EVENT DATA RECORDERS (EDRS), III-2 tbl.III-1 (2006) (estimating that 
64.3% of new cars sold in 2004 came equipped with EDRs); see also Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., U.S. DOT Proposes Broader Use of Event Data Recorders to 
Help Improve Vehicle Safety (Dec. 7, 2012), https://www.transportation.gov/ 
briefing-room/us-dot-proposes-broader-use-event-data-recorders-help-improve-
vehicle-safety [https://perma.cc/RCQ4-XKF6]. 
 87. See 49 C.F.R. § 563.11(a) (2013) (requiring that EDRs store specific 
information for thirty seconds after a triggering impact). 
 88. See Driver Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1712 (2015). 
 89. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF INDUSTRIES: 
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 9 (2016). 
 90. Id. 
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searches.91 “Newer cars may record a driver’s eye movements, the 
weight of people in the front seats and whether the driver’s hands are 
on the wheel.”92 In addition, modern recordation of operational data 
far outpaces the black box pre-collision recordings.93 Data about 
vehicle speed, direction, distances, time, fuel consumption, and tire 
pressure, among other recorded operations, transform the car into a 
constantly updated driving history.94 The Government Accountability 
Office cited locational information as a privacy threat, noting that 
storing location data “create[s] a detailed profile of individual 
behavior, including habits, preferences, and routes traveled.”95 This 
data is valuable beyond vehicle maintenance. Already, startup 
companies are specializing in collecting and selling car data to third 
parties.96  
Insurers promise lower premiums in exchange for driving data.97 
Progressive’s Snapshot collects speed, time of day, miles driven, rates 
of acceleration, and braking, but not location.98Although Progressive’s 
privacy policy states that the data will not be used to resolve insurance 
claims without consent, the public has been somewhat slow to 
embrace real-time insurance monitoring, a fact that prompted 
Progressive to launch new marketing approaches aimed at alleviating 
 
 91. See Quain, supra note 83. This leads to the collection of vast amounts of 
location information that exposes extensive private information on driver habits such 
as where a driver lives and works or where they go for entertainment. See id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Peppet, supra note 50, at 106 (noting that while a traditional EDR 
typically records and stores only a few seconds of data prior to a crash, modern 
diagnostics “track a vehicle’s location or a driver’s performance over time”).  
 94. See Quain, supra note 83; see also Jamie Todd Rubin, Testing Automatic 
Link, the FitBit for Your Car, DAILY BEAST (July 8, 2014, 5:45 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/08/testing-automatic-link-the-fitbit-
for-your-car.html [https://perma.cc/6CJD-EWLM]. 
 95. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-649T, CONSUMERS’ 
LOCATION DATA: COMPANIES TAKE STEPS TO PROTECT PRIVACY, BUT PRACTICES ARE 
INCONSISTENT, AND RISKS MAY NOT BE CLEAR TO CONSUMERS (2014). 
 96. See, e.g., Automotive Data in Motion, OTONOMO, http://otonomo.io/ 
about-us/ [https://perma.cc/94DK-AXEJ] (last visited May 24, 2019) (describing 
automotive data collection services). 
 97. See Quain, supra note 83 (stating that “insurance companies are 
experimenting with apps and dongles that record braking, acceleration and speed with 
the lure of lower rates for well-mannered drivers”).  
 98. See Snapshot® Privacy Statement, PROGRESSIVE, 
https://www.progressive.com/support/legal/snapshot-privacy-statement/ 
[https://perma.cc/94DK-AXEJ] (last visited May 24, 2019).  
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consumer concern.99 Rental cars also store large amounts of consumer 
information gathered from inside the car.100 Dashboard cameras 
accompany one out of every eight Hertz cars, for example.101 Notably, 
the cameras are “not outward-facing cameras monitoring the road, but 
inward-facing cameras capable of making audio and video recordings 
of everything inside the passenger compartment.”102  
Like the proliferation of technology in the home, the infusion of 
technology in the car generates new vulnerabilities. Researchers have 
been able to hack into and wrest control away from drivers of 
connected cars.103 In one widely published experiment, researchers 
hacked into a car’s software, enabling remote control using laptops.104 
The researchers cut the power steering, spoofed the GPS, and forced 
the speedometer to show false speeds, all outside the driver’s 
control.105 The researchers demonstrated the ability to jerk the steering 
wheel in either direction at any speed.106 A follow-up study showed 
that researchers could penetrate the same critical systems by targeting 
the car’s cellular connection, Bluetooth bugs, smartphone app, and a 
 
 99. See Snapshot® Plug-In Device: Terms & Conditions, PROGRESSIVE, 
http://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshot-terms-conditions/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2LM5-GEA7] (last updated May 11, 2017). 
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condition, mileage, diagnostic, and performance reporting of vehicles. See id. Its 
privacy policy claims that Enterprise is “not responsible for any data that is left in the 
vehicle” and that it “cannot guarantee the privacy or confidentiality of such 
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 101. See Jennifer Abel, Hertz Putting Passenger-Compartment Cameras in 
Rental Cars, CONSUMER AFFAIRS, https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/hertz-
putting-passenger-compartment-cameras-in-rental-cars-031815.html 
[https://perma.cc/7SKW-2K4Y] (last visited May 24, 2019). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Charlie Miller & Chris Valasek, Adventures in Automotive Networks 
and Control Units, IOACTIVE, (2014); see also Steve Henn, With Smarter Cars, the 
Doors Are Open to Hacking Dangers, NPR (July 30, 2013, 3:48 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/07/30/206800198/Smarter-
Cars-Open-New-Doors-To-Smarter-Thieves [https://perma.cc/JF5B-EFCV]. 
 104. See Henn, supra note 103.  
 105. See id. 
 106. See id.; see also Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the 
Highway—With Me in It, WIRED (July 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/ 
[https://perma.cc/7EA9-WVWB]; Bruce Schneier, Hackers Stealing Cars, SCHNEIER 
ON SEC. BLOG (Aug. 11, 2016, 6:32 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/ 
2016/08/hackers_stealin.html [https://perma.cc/X5XR-SD4J]. 
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malicious audio file on a CD in the car’s stereo system.107 Even a 
wireless tire pressure gauge was exploited, allowing access to the car’s 
core functionality.108  
If the route from home to work does not include a car, the 
Internet of Things nevertheless awaits. Consider the many 
photographic technologies that capture daily images from diverse 
vantages. Smartphones are by far the most prolific. By 2020, 6.1 
billion people will have phones with picture-taking capabilities.109 
More than 2.5 trillion images are shared or stored on the Internet 
annually.110 Surveillance cameras, as distinguished from smartphones, 
are also proliferating, with 106 million new surveillance cameras sold 
in one year.111  
In Chicago, 30,000 government-operated closed-circuit cameras 
survey the public’s coming and going.112 To combat high murder rates, 
the police leverage these cameras, setting up surveillance centers 
within police stations that monitor the license plate of every passing 
vehicle, photographs of repeat offenders, gang boundaries, previous 
911 reports, and more.113 Officers can “commandeer the cameras to 
get a 360-degree view of the area.”114 The data not only allows police 
 
 107. See Andy Greenberg, Hackers Reveal Nasty New Car Attacks—With Me 
Behind the Wheel (Video), FORBES (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/ 
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 108. See Nathan, supra note 55. But see FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, 
at 12 (noting that although a panelist was able “to hack into a car’s built-in telematics 
unit and control the vehicle’s engine[,]” he noted that “the risk to car owners today is 
incredibly small”). 
 109. Andy Boxall, The Number of Smartphone Users in the World is Expected 
to Reach a Giant 6.1 Billion by 2020, DIGITAL TRENDS (June 3, 2015, 6:23 AM), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/smartphone-users-number-6-1-billion-by-
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 110. Predictions: Photo Sharing: Trillions and Rising, DELOITTE, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/lk/en/pages/technology-media-and-telecommunications/ 
articles/tmt-pred16-telecomm-photo-sharing-trillions-and-rising.html 
[https://perma.cc/EQ8K-WTGQ] (“Deloitte Global predicts that in 2016, 2.5 trillion 
photos will be shared or stored online.”) (last visited May 24, 2019).  
 111. Terry Gross, With Closed-Circuit TV, Satellites and Phones, Millions of 
Cameras Are Watching, NPR (Feb. 8, 2018, 2:27 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
2018/02/08/584243140/with-closed-circuit-tv-satellites-and-phones-millions-of-
cameras-are-watching [https://perma.cc/V7EU-STLD].  
 112. Timothy Williams, Can 30,000 Cameras Help Solve Chicago’s Crime 
Problem?, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/26/us/ 
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 113. See id.  
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to respond more quickly, but it also provides the raw input for software 
that reputedly predicts future crime.115  
Linked cameras like those in Chicago are proliferating in New 
York, Baltimore, and Houston.116 Police in Louisville want to use 
drones when responding to gunshots, and facial recognition 
technology is being considered in large counties in Florida and 
Oregon.117 Security cameras on privately owned homes and buildings 
further expand the photographic data captured during transit from 
home to work.118 
More than three million ATMs photograph their customers.119 
Tens of thousands of cameras perched over roadways record license 
plates, vehicle speed, and location.120 Body cameras are no longer 
relegated to police, as medical professionals and others don cameras 
to capture the entirety of the workday.121 Cameras adorn car 
dashboards, cyclists’ helmets, doorbells, entryways to stores, and 
places of public accommodation.122 There are “billions of images of 
unsuspecting citizens captured by facial-recognition technology and 
stored in law enforcement and private-sector databases over which our 
control is practically nonexistent.”123 
Many, if not most, of these devices operate without the consent 
of the person photographed and often without that person’s 
 
 115. See id.  
 116. See id. 
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 118. See Walter Pincus, Many Cameras, Little Privacy, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 
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BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.ATM.TOTL.P5?view=chart [https:// 
perma.cc/KL48-BFDY] (last visited May 24, 2019).  
 120. See David Gray, A Collective Right to Be Secure from Unreasonable 
Tracking, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 189, 197 (2015) (noting that “security cameras, 
license plate readers, and other imaging technologies increasingly monitor our public 
spaces”).  
 121. See Peter Swire & Jesse Woo, Privacy and Cybersecurity Lessons at the 
Intersection of the Internet of Things and Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. 
REV. 1475, 1482 (2018) (“Use of BWCs is beginning to migrate from the policing 
context into other sectors, including healthcare and education.”).  
 122. See Robert Draper, They Are Watching You—and Everything Else on the 
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May 24, 2019). 
 123. Id.  
392 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
knowledge.124 That is certainly the case with more remote technologies 
like drones and satellites.125 In 2016, American consumers and 
businesses purchased 2.5 million drones, a number that does not 
include government-operated drones.126 Higher still in elevation, more 
than 1,700 satellites monitor the planet.127 While many are operated by 
government entities, a private company, Planet, now operates more 
functioning satellites than the U.S. government.128 With more than 200 
in orbit, the company can image every parcel of land in the world 
every day.129  
From the ground up, imaging technologies capture more and 
more data exhaust.130 Starting with smartphones and moving up to 
rooftop cameras and drones, the monitoring capacity moves skyward 
to satellites orbiting 300 miles away.131 Whether inside a connected car 
or walking down a city sidewalk, the privacy landscape outside the 
home continues to change.132  
C. The Internet of Things at Work 
Employers, too, collect and analyze data exhaust through the 
Internet of Things.133 Indeed, the Internet of Things increasingly 
influences whether an employee is hired in the first place.134 Large 
companies now consult data brokers before hiring key personnel.135 
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 125. See id. 
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 127. Id.  
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Data brokers collect and sell a capacious array of information, 
including “browsing history, online purchases, and any information 
about you that’s publicly available: property records, court cases, 
marital status, [and] social-media connections.”136  
One of the largest data brokers, Acxiom, curates an average of 
1,500 pieces of information on more than 500 million consumers.137 
Some companies now specialize in scouring social media and other 
Internet sites for the sole purpose of providing information about job 
applicants.138 A prospective employer would likely be interested in an 
applicant’s mortgage balance, 2011 bankruptcy, and prescription for 
antidepressants, to say nothing of the applicant’s work history and 
Internet browsing predilections.139 
Once hired, the Internet of Things pervades the workplace. For 
a while now, employers have monitored and recorded an employee’s 
use of work computers, including browsing history.140 This line blurs, 
however, with more and more employees bringing their own devices 
to work.141 These personal devices often include work-related content 
and often connect through the employer’s server.142 
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About Me Online, THE ATLANTIC (June 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2017/06/online-data-brokers/529281/ [https://perma.cc/Q6FS-
ZCJ6]. 
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Employee badges are no longer limited to identification and 
building access.143 They record and transmit when the employee 
arrives and leaves, often tracking the employee long after the workday 
ends.144 Newer iterations of employee badges record audio as well, 
allowing employers to record everything that is said and to whom.145 
Tone of voice and rapidity of speech can affect an employer’s 
evaluation of the employee’s productivity.146 One company leverages 
production software to encourage certain employees to speak with 
certain other employees.147 Automated furnishings shift to encourage 
employee interactions that will lead to more efficient work product.148 
Employers also leverage data gleaned by the Internet of Things to 
track employee health.149 Wellness initiatives seek to lower the cost of 
employer-provided healthcare by promoting healthy lifestyles.150 
Tracking devices like Fitbits have been integrated into wellness 
initiatives, transmitting personal health data to employers.151 Such 
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 149. See The Best of 2015: 9 Companies That Nailed It, FITBIT, 
http://content.fitbit.com/Best_Of_2015.html?promosrc=website [https://perma.cc/ 
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programs carry the extra risk that employers monitor employee 
behavior even outside of work.152  
In the workplace, the Internet of Things is not limited to robotics 
and factory floors that are increasingly devoid of humans. It is much 
more. It is a tool that provides ceaseless and multilayered surveillance 
of employees while simultaneously influencing employee behavior to 
increase productivity.153 Whether at home, in transit, or at work, the 
Internet of Things collects our data exhaust. In many instances, 
permission to collect the data is not requested.154 Indeed, we often have 
no idea it’s happening.155 This passively collected data can be 
extremely revealing, especially when combined with other personal 
information gleaned from other sources like social media and public 
records.156 Data brokers do just that—compile large dossiers on most 
consumers.157 The dossiers aggregate data for sale to any who would 
pay.158  
II. DATA BROKERS AND AFTER-COLLECTION PRIVACY HARMS 
A. Data Brokers: Shrouded, Growing, and Profitable 
The data broker industry is relatively unknown to the public.159 
While data brokers incessantly seek consumer information, they 
 
 152. See NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., ON YOUR TRACKS: GPS TRACKING IN THE 
WORKPLACE 20, 22, https://epic.org/privacy/workplace/gps-traking.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/PFN2-VPVJ] (last visited May 24, 2019). 
 153. See Tran, supra note 80, at 273 (noting that companies may use analytics 
to interpret this sensor data and monitor employee productivity or efficiency, 
potentially violating an employee’s expectations of privacy). 
 154. See Swire & Woo, supra note 121, at 1523; see also Peppet, supra note 
50, at 140–41 (noting that because many connected devices lack a screen or other user 
interface, meaningful notice and consent is illusory). 
 155. See Peppet, supra note 50, at 141. 
 156. See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data 
Economy, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1379 (2017) (“Companies are frequently using 
cross-device tracking—connecting the activities of users ‘across [their] smartphones, 
tablets, desktop computers,’ and IOT devices—to collect information about 
consumers.”).  
 157. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 15–21 
(2014). 
 158. See id.  
 159. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2014) [hereinafter FTC DATA BROKER 
REPORT]. 
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subvert information about themselves.160 One commentator 
characterized the multi-billion dollar industry as “invisible” and 
purposefully so.161 In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
removed a portion of the veil to show “how data brokers amass 
detailed profiles about consumers from an array of online and offline 
sources, largely without consumers’ knowledge, and then sell those 
profiles to other data brokers and businesses.”162 The FTC ordered nine 
data brokers to divulge information about their data collection 
practices.163 The orders requested information regarding “the nature 
and sources of consumer data they collect; how they use, maintain, 
and disseminate the data; and the extent to which the data brokers 
allow consumers to access and correct data about them or to opt out of 
having their personal information sold or shared.”164 
The FTC report surveyed nine data brokers, but thousands more 
collect, analyze, and sell consumer data in the United States.165 A data 
broker is an entity “whose primary business is collecting personal 
information about consumers from a variety of sources and 
aggregating, analyzing, and sharing that information, or information 
derived from it.”166 Several variations of data brokers operate in the 
U.S.; some have a narrow or specific focus as to the data collected and 
the clients served, whereas others generally collect as much data as 
possible. Paramount Lists, for example, sells lists of those suffering 
from depression and other mental illnesses.167 Another broker, Great 
Lakes List Management, sells lists of households where Alzheimer’s 
patients reside, purportedly for use by “pharmaceutical compan[ies] 
 
 160. See Theodore Rostow, What Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your 
Data? A New Privacy Harm in the Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 667, 674 
(2017) (“Unlike large companies like Google and Facebook, data brokers try to avoid 
name recognition . . . .”).  
 161. Leanne Roderick, Discipline and Power in the Digital Age: The Case of 
the U.S. Consumer Data Broker Industry, 40(5) CRITICAL SOC. 729 (2014).  
 162. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Data Brokers: A Call 
for Transparency and Accountability Opening Remarks of Chairwoman Edith 
Ramirez (May 27, 2014). 
 163. FTC DATA BROKER REPORT, supra note 159, at ii (identifying the 
following data brokers for the FTC study: Acxiom, Corelogic, Datalogix, eBureau, 
ID Analytics, Intelius, PeekYou, Rapleaf, and Recorded Future). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Rostow, supra note 160, at 669.  
 166. FTC DATA BROKER REPORT, supra note 159, at 3.  
 167. See Melanie Hicken, Big Data Knows You’re Sick, Tired and Depressed, 
CNN MONEY (June 3, 2014), https://money.cnn.com/2014/06/01/pf/data-consumer-
health/index.html [https://perma.cc/J3LU-N5D9]. 
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offering new medications.”168 Acxiom, by contrast, boasts an average 
of 1,500 pieces of information on more than 500 million consumers.169 
The data broker industry has recently expanded by orders of 
magnitude in the U.S. and has proved profitable.170 The nine brokers 
studied by the FTC posted a combined $426 million in annual 
revenue.171 And that was in 2012.172 In 2018, Acxiom alone projected 
annual revenue of approximately $945 million,173 lending weight to 
the once hyperbolic claim that personal data is the new oil.174 The basic 
model of collecting personal data for later sale reinforces the drive to 
glean as much detailed data as possible. The more complete a user 
profile, the more valuable it is. Where do data brokers get personal 
consumer data, and what types of data are included? 
B. Data Brokers: Collection, Consumers, and Clients 
First, data brokers have captured much data.175 They leverage 
“billions of individual data points to produce detailed portraits of 
virtually every American consumer.”176 One researcher posits that 
“there is little question that the major data brokers know more about 
 
 168. Id.  
 169. Tucker, supra note 137.  
 170. See Rostow, supra note 160, at 674; see also FTC DATA BROKER REPORT, 
supra note 159, at vii, 23 (finding that “data broker practices have grown dramatically, 
in both breadth and depth, as data brokers have expanded their ability to collect 
information from a greater number of sources, including from consumers’ online 
activities; analyze it through new algorithms and emerging business models; and store 
the information indefinitely due to reduced storage costs”). 
 171. See FTC DATA BROKER REPORT, supra note 159, at 23. 
 172. See id.  
 173. Sacha Molitorisz, It’s Time for Third-Party Data Brokers to Emerge from 
the Shadows, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 4, 2018), https://theconversation.com/its-
time-for-third-party-data-brokers-to-emerge-from-the-shadows-94298 [https:// 
perma.cc/997P-MXH6]. 
 174. See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, The Glass House Effect: Big Data, the New 
Oil, and the Power of Analogy, 66 ME. L. REV. 373, 374 (2014). 
 175. See FTC DATA BROKER REPORT, supra note 159, at iv (finding in the FTC 
study of only nine data brokers, “one data broker’s database has information on 1.4 
billion consumer transactions and over 700 billion aggregated data elements; another 
data broker’s database covers one trillion dollars in consumer transactions; and yet 
another data broker adds three billion new records each month to its databases”). 
 176. Craig Timberg, Brokers Use ‘Billions’ of Data Points to Profile 
Americans, WASH. POST (May 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
technology/brokers-use-billions-of-data-points-to-profile-americans/2014/05/27/ 
b4207b96-e5b2-11e3-a86b362fd5443d19_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_ 
term=.b7ee81dc276e [https://perma.cc/39BH-AU5W]. 
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each of us than say, for example, the National Security Agency, the 
Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security Administration, or any 
other government institution.”177 But no comprehensive study reveals 
where data brokers get their information.178  
The limited FTC report from 2014 shows that public sources, 
including local, state, and federal governments, provide a range of 
personal data about bankruptcy filings, professional licensing, and 
eligibility to receive government contracts or other benefits.179 
Localized public records, like those involving taxes, mortgages, 
property interests, foreclosures, motor vehicle registrations, driving 
records, and criminal records, also contribute.180 But public records, of 
course, are not the sole source of information for data brokers. 
Data brokers buy consumer purchase and web-browsing data, 
including information about consumers’ everyday interactions.181 Data 
brokers also buy and sell data among themselves.182 In the FTC study, 
the nine data brokers obtained much of their information—including 
the purchase history of 190 million individual consumers from more 
than 2,600 merchants and self-reported information that consumers 
provided online or offline through marketing surveys, warranty 
registrations, and contests—from other data brokers.183 Moreover, 
each data broker used multiple sources for similar data.184 One broker 
obtained consumers’ contact information from twenty different 
sources.185 
Notably, laws often protect some of this data but do so in a 
limited fashion. Data brokers need only obtain the data from an 
unrestricted party.186 For example, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) bars medical providers from selling or 
 
 177. David C. Vladeck, Consumer Protection in an Era of Big Data Analytics, 
42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 493, 498 (2016). 
 178. See FTC DATA BROKER REPORT, supra note 159, at 11–15.  
 179. See id. at 11.  
 180. See id. at 11–13. 
 181. See id. at iv.  
 182. See id. at 12–13.  
 183. Id. at 14.  
 184. See id.  
 185. See id. 
 186. For example, several states restrict their departments of motor vehicles 
from disclosing motor vehicle records. See id. at 13 n.38. (finding that “[a]t least 
twenty-three states have state laws governing the disclosure of motor vehicle records 
that prohibit companies from using such information”). That data, however, often 
emerges in a myriad of other contexts that are readily accessible by data brokers. See 
id. at 11–15. 
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freely transferring medical data about a patient’s mental illness,187 but 
data brokers access and retain that information if the patient 
unwittingly reveals her illness through her web browsing history or in 
an online survey.188 A disabled person searching online (or at a brick-
and-mortar store) for a wheelchair generates data exhaust from a web 
search followed by the retailer’s electronic record. HIPAA does not 
bar the sharing of this information. Nor does HIPPA restrict health 
data gleaned by Fitbits, Apple Watches, or other devices emerging in 
the Internet of Things.189  
Because data brokers also buy and sell data among themselves, 
it increases the likelihood that sensitive data nominally protected by 
sectoral statutes will end up in a consumer profile.190 The digital world 
is porous.191 The web diffuses personal data.192 When personal data can 
be gathered from a panoply of varying sources, privacy laws that 
restrict one source only fail.  
This duplication and diffusion of personal information accounts 
in part for the industry’s shrouded nature. No direct line connects a 
consumer’s personal data to a data broker.193 As the FTC reported, data 
brokers do not obtain personal information directly from consumers.194 
A wide range of sources, including public records, web-browsing 
trackers, transaction records gleaned from commercial retailers, and 
social media posts, feed into broker databases.195 Data brokers then 
buy and sell information among themselves, and while each source 
may provide a single data point about a consumer, in the aggregate 
 
 187. See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 936 (1996) (codified as amended in various sections of 18, 
26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). Data brokers are not covered entities under HIPAA, which are 
defined to include certain doctors’ offices, hospitals, insurance companies, and others 
that electronically bill insurance companies. See Covered Entities and Business 
Associates, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/ 
hipaa/for-professionals/covered-entities/index.html [https://perma.cc/BUY5-FXXD] 
(last updated June 16, 2017). 
 188. See, e.g., Rebecca Lipman, Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for 
Our Data, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 777, 788 (2016). 
 189. See id.  
 190. See id. (noting that data brokers buy and sell data among themselves and 
that laws protecting sensitive information, like HIPAA, do not apply to data brokers). 
 191. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY 
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 44–47 (2004). 
 192. See id.  
 193. See FTC DATA BROKER REPORT, supra note 159, at 11–15. 
 194. See id.  
 195. See id.  
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brokers compile comprehensive composites.196 The FTC concluded 
that “it would be virtually impossible for a consumer to determine how 
a data broker obtained his or her data; the consumer would have to 
retrace the path of data through a series of data brokers.”197  
C. Data Brokers: Analysis, Categorization, and Resulting Harms 
Of course, brokers are not limited to gathering personal data; 
they also analyze it.198 In so doing, they introduce a new raft of privacy 
harms. In addition to amorphous anxiety stemming from the prospect 
of constant monitoring,199 the practice of sorting and categorizing 
consumers carries risks of profiling,200 discrimination,201 social 
engineering,202 stratification,203 and identity theft.204  
To market the data collected, brokers employ learning 
algorithms.205 Software enables manipulation of enormous amounts of 
data and generates precise segments of the population sought by 
brokers’ clients.206 Categories themselves are wide-ranging and often 
divide groups by ethnicity, income, religion, and political views.207 
More discrete categories like “Consumers Interested in Buying 
Camping Gear” and “Consumers that are Likely to Seek a 
Chargeback” target specific retail clients.208 But other categories like 
 
 196. See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the 
Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1889–90 (2013) (describing the 
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 205. See Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy 
Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 378 (2006); see also FTC DATA BROKER 
REPORT, supra note 159, at 49. 
 206. See Lipman, supra note 188, at 781–82. 
 207. See FTC DATA BROKER REPORT, supra note 159, at 19–21.  
 208. Id. at 19. 
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“Urban Scramble” and “Mobile Mixers” consist of Latino and 
African-American consumers with low incomes.209  
In fact, a host of categories focus on these defining attributes.210 
The many groups defined by race, age, and low income suggest a 
robust demand from broker clientele.211 Providers of high-interest 
loans, appliance rentals, payday loans, and other high-risk products 
target this demographic.212 In one disturbing account, a data broker 
sold several categories of personal data to a telemarketer client.213 
Each category included elder consumers that appeared vulnerable.214 
“Suffering Seniors” comprised elderly people with cancer.215 “Oldies 
but Goodies” included people over fifty-five who liked to gamble, and 
“Elderly Opportunity Seekers” consisted of older people seeking 
money-making opportunities.216 One category explicitly characterized 
its members as “gullible,” saying “[t]hey want to believe that their luck 
 
 209. Id. at 20. 
 210. As noted by the Federal Trade Commission, other categories that 
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 212. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Recommends Congress 
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https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/ftc-recommends-congress-
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 213. See Charles Duhigg, Bilking the Elderly, With a Corporate Assist, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 20, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/business/ 20tele.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4PZG-867Z]. 
 214. See id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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can change.”217 The telemarketer used these data sets to “trick 
vulnerable senior citizens into revealing their bank information in 
order to raid their accounts.”218 
The potential privacy harms are diverse and include the 
manipulation of consumers by commercial interests, the profiling of 
consumers to the benefit of members of one category and detriment of 
another, the profiling of vulnerable consumers to facilitate third party 
exploitation, identity theft achieved by criminal clients purchasing 
detailed personal data, blackmail, and more. Moreover, the 
information housed by data brokers is often not secured.219 In 2003, 
hackers accessed an estimated 1.6 billion records containing personal 
information following a data breach at Acxiom.220 Additionally, broker 
profiles contain mistakes.221 One large broker admitted that up to 30% 
of the information in a consumer’s profile “may be wrong at any given 
time.”222 Erroneous profiling can have cascading negative effects on 
the consumer, particularly in light of the documented difficulty in 
correcting inaccurate information.223 
Even the more abstract privacy harms merit consideration. The 
Hawthorne Effect (also referred to as the observer effect) is a reaction 
in which individuals modify an aspect of their behavior in response to 
their awareness of being observed.224 Most Americans are currently 
unaware of the pervasiveness of data monitoring.225 This will 
eventually change as data brokers and their clients become 
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 218. Ashley Kuempel, The Invisible Middlemen: A Critique and Call for 
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 220. See id. at 379. 
 221. See Lipman, supra note 188, at 782. 
 222. Id. (quoting Melanie Hicken, Find Out What Big Data Knows About You 
(It May Be Very Wrong), CNN MONEY (Sept. 5, 2013, 2:02 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/05/pf/acxiom-consumer-data [https://perma.cc/NMJ5 
-QCYJ]). 
 223. See id.; see also Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public 
Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1186–87 (2002) 
(discussing the social dangers involved with aggregate data brokering); FTC DATA 
BROKER REPORT, supra note 159, at iv (noting the difficulty of tracing consumer 
personal data to data broker). 
 224. See Bill Delmore, Cameras in the Courtroom: Limited Access Only, 67 
TEX. B.J. 782, 783 (2004). 
 225. See FTC DATA BROKER REPORT, supra note 159, at iv (“Data brokers do 
not obtain this data directly from consumers, and consumers are thus largely unaware 
that data brokers are collecting and using this information.”). 
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increasingly adept at leveraging the oceans of searchable personal data 
compiled on each of us.226 When public awareness catches up to the 
reality of universal monitoring, self-censorship based on permanent 
visibility could very well change society on a large scale. Knowing 
that nearly every action—including every web search, non-cash 
purchase, and physical movement—is captured and analyzed portends 
cultural and societal homogenization.227  
With harms ranging from abstract (and perhaps unlikely) 
homogenization to concrete identity theft, a legal structure enacted to 
forestall these harms might be expected. But the data broker industry, 
increasingly fueled by the Internet of Things, is self-regulated.228 One 
commentator colorfully acknowledged this oddity: “As shady as it 
might sound, the entire industry is completely legal.”229 Indeed, 
Congress has not passed a statute expanding privacy protections in 
more than a decade.230 
In summary, the data broker industry houses mountains of 
consumer data, much of it highly specific and personal.231 Virtually 
unregulated, the industry is poised to propagate a wide range of 
privacy harms, all without consumer knowledge.232  
III. NOTICE, CONSENT, AND REGULATION BY ACCRETION 
Regulations safeguarding data privacy have developed by 
accretion, with new laws building off their predecessors. In the U.S., 
for example, the 1974 Privacy Act introduced “fair information 
practices,” which included an individual’s right to notice and consent 
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 232. See generally Boutin, supra note 229. 
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before personal data could be collected and used.233 The law further 
allowed access to one’s personal information.234 Once collected by a 
third party, the law imposed a legal obligation to secure the data.235 
This basic structure of notice, consent, access, and security remains 
the dominant regulatory scheme today.236 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), an international nongovernmental organization,237 adopted 
the same structure when it set forth guidelines in 1980: Before 
personal information could be collected, the data subject must have 
notice of the pending collection and give his or her consent.238 The 
OECD’s guidelines in turn became the blueprint for binding 
legislation throughout the European Union.239  
A. European Union Privacy Law  
Adopted in 1995, the E.U.’s Data Protection Directive set the 
international standard for data privacy and security regulation.240 It too 
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relied on notice, consent, access, and security.241 In addition, the 
Directive sought to regulate the use and transfer of the data after 
collection, providing that personal data could be collected only for 
“specified, explicit[,] and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes.”242 
The Directive is arguably the most important data privacy law to 
date,243 due in part to its comprehensive scope and its 
extrajurisdictional reach.244 The law forbids transfer of the personal 
data of E.U. citizens to other countries until those countries prove 
compliance with the Directive by enacting adequate regulatory 
protections.245 The Directive spurred a trend among technologically 
advanced countries toward adopting nationalized data privacy laws 
that materially mimicked the Directive.246 Effective in May 2018, the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) superseded the Directive 
in the E.U.247 It also relies on notice, consent, access, security, limited 
use, and transfer.248 Like the Directive, the GDPR carries 
extrajurisdictional ramifications by requiring countries or entities to 
prove compliance with the GDPR before allowing the transfer of E.U.-
held personal data.249 
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Importantly, this regulatory scheme predated the Internet, the 
data economy, and certainly the Internet of Things.250 Although the 
GDPR was adopted in 2016 and became effective in 2018, its 
regulatory framework stems from a 1974 statute.251 The GDPR’s 
framework and the implicit assumptions inherent therein are ill-suited 
to meet the privacy threats posed by ubiquitous rooftop cameras, 
license plate readers, and sensors engrafted onto otherwise ordinary 
objects. In other words, the legal framework relies principally on 
notice to and consent from the user before information is gathered and 
used.252 But much of the data harvested by the Internet of Things 
occurs without the user’s knowledge or consent.253 
License plate readers, whether private or public, do not solicit 
consent before snapping images, nor do video doorbells, dashboard 
cameras, ATMs, or purposefully miniscule cameras embedded in 
hotel elevators. When notice and consent occur, they fail to address 
the collection of bystander data.254 While a user might read the 
licensing agreement and fully consent to divulging personal 
information when installing a smart thermostat, what about her 
guests?  
Rental economies, whether for cars, homes, appliances, or 
computers, interject more barriers to the effectiveness of notice and 
consent.255 Thousands of rented computers, for example, include 
software that include not only a remote shutoff if payment is overdue 
but also a “Detective Mode,” a feature that allows creditors to secretly 
turn on the laptop’s webcam and take pictures of the user or whomever 
else is within range.256 In one instance, surreptitious pictures were 
 
 250. See, e.g., NICK COULDRY, MEDIA, SOCIETY, WORLD: SOCIAL THEORY AND 
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 251. See supra Part III. 
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 256. Caroline Lester, Why Today’s Rent-to-Own Economy Presents a Host of 
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taken of Pennsylvania schoolchildren in their bedrooms after they had 
checked out public school computers.257 
Even if notice is provided, how detailed must it be? Does the 
occupant of a home hooked to a smart meter have notice that the 
unique electrical signal emanating from the home reveals the exact 
movie she watched last night, which light bulbs are currently on, and 
when she is away on vacation?258 As technology incessantly pushes 
forward, full notice and informed consent are largely impotent.259 The 
diversifying ways in which data is collected coupled with the endless 
inferences drawn from that data make it nearly impossible to provide 
complete and full notice.  
Although laudable in many respects, the GDPR fails to envision 
a world populated by the Internet of Things. The law principally 
targets the process of data collection rather than its after-captured 
use.260 It focuses on how personal data is harvested rather than the 
harms occasioned by privacy breaches.261 It fails to acknowledge that 
reams of personal data have been collected already.262 When just one 
data broker holds 5,000 pieces of information on over 500 million 
people, the GDPR’s focus on restricting the collection of personal data 
seems quaint.263  
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 260. See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 245, at 36. 
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 263. Tucker, supra note 137. 
408 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
It is true that the GDPR also purports to regulate the use of 
personal data after its collection.264 But the GDPR’s capacious scope 
emasculates the effectiveness of use-based restrictions because the 
law applies universally and is not tailored to identified privacy 
harms.265 This overbreadth makes the GDPR difficult to evenly 
enforce.266 Perhaps this is most clearly seen in the continued reliance 
upon the definition of personally identifiable information (PII).267 The 
GDPR outlaws illicit data collection only if it was personal.268 This has 
proven to be a murky concept at best.269 Names, addresses, and social 
security numbers qualify as PII, but what about data that when 
combined with other data enables identification?  
Instead of drafting a detailed definition or including a 
representative list of PII, the GDPR defines personal data as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.”270 
It bears repeating. The law captures any information “relating” to an 
identifiable person.271 It is an extremely broad definition. If the data 
could feasibly enable the holder to connect it to a specific person, even 
if the holder himself cannot make the connection, the GDPR is 
triggered.272 One commentator noted that the definition of PII 
“encompasses . . . more information than those European legislators 
could . . . have imagined— . . . more than all the bits and bytes in the 
entire world when they wrote their law [eighteen] years ago.”273 
It includes the innocuous processing of “personal data” rather 
than the harms occasioned by its misuse.274 It fails to appreciate data 
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captured by the Internet of Things.275 As noted by one commentator, 
“efforts toward a concise definition of what constitutes PII are quickly 
deprecated as new [Internet of Things] technologies unlock and 
combine new sets of data that can enable identification and make it 
increasingly difficult to distinguish PII from non-PII.”276 Given the 
enormity of the data now available and in light of the algorithms that 
analyze it, almost any bit of data can be personally identifiable.277 The 
more data we have, the less any of it can be considered private. 
In conjunction with its extraterritorial reach, the GDPR’s ability 
to capture any information relating to an identifiable person renders it 
nearly unbounded in scope.278 The fact that the data must relate to an 
E.U. resident is arguably the operative limitation.279 As a result, the 
E.U. “bring[s] all providers of Internet services such as websites, 
social networking services and app providers under the scope of the 
[E.U.] [r]egulation as soon as they interact with data subjects residing 
in the European Union.”280 This overbreadth frustrates the law’s 
effectiveness.281 If everyone that has anything to do with an E.U. 
resident comes within the ambit of the law, a host of innocent 
transactions causing no privacy harm must comply.282  
Anonymization, for the same reason, fails to inoculate data.283 
Merely stripping the name off locational data, for example, does not 
prevent that locational data from identifying the user.284 Advances in 
computer science increase the likelihood of re-identifying supposedly 
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“anonymized” data, rendering futile many attempts to protect privacy 
with anonymity.285 Commercial transactions, browsing histories, 
public records, and much more populate de-anonymizing algorithms, 
prompting the observation that “any attribute can be identifying in 
combination with others.”286 Consequently, the GDPR’s amorphous 
scope captures a sea of “innocent” interactions—data processing that 
threatens no privacy harm whatsoever.287 
This capacious scope in turn encourages discretionary 
enforcement.288 If applied literally, officials could seize almost any 
digital device in Europe since smartphones and laptops likely contain 
information that could lead to information “relating” to an identifiable 
person.289 Laws that identify as wrongdoers a disproportionately large 
ratio of those governed have historically been disfavored because they 
imbue law enforcement with unchecked authority to prosecute 
disfavored citizens, promoting corruption over compliance.290 
Unlike in Europe, where the law regards privacy as a 
fundamental right, U.S. privacy law has been described often as 
“sectoral.”291 Several industries, like the medical and financial sectors 
for example, must comply with industry-specific legislation aimed at 
protecting discrete private information.292 Perhaps owing to a 
preference for free speech,293 informational privacy as a standalone 
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comprehensive right is not nationally protected under the Constitution 
or by federal statute.294 
In fact, a law review article by Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis often provides the starting point for those researching U.S. 
privacy law.295 The authors’ stated purpose was “to consider whether 
the existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked to 
protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature 
and extent of such protection is.”296 Just by posing the question the 
authors concede the lack of a clear principle animating legal privacy 
protections. Although the authors identified principles to support 
privacy law, they also articulated several limitations, and commentary 
from a law review article lacks the permanence attending statutory 
enactment or constitutional warrant.297 
Given this history, the absence of a comprehensive privacy right 
in the U.S. is unsurprising. Instead, industry-specific legislation has 
created a patchwork of privacy laws.298 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
limits the use of private financial data,299 for example, and HIPAA 
regulates the use of “protected health information.”300 The Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act regulates information that attends 
credit reporting,301 and the Video Privacy Protection Act bans 
“wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale records.”302 Notably, 
the definition of personal information found in the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act differs from that found in the Video Privacy Protection 
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Act, which in turn differs from that found in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act.303 
The patchwork of unrelated privacy laws continues to frustrate 
businesses and organizations that routinely process consumer 
information, particularly those that are reliant on ecommerce.304 
“Companies are frustrated by the lack of harmonisation and the fact 
that they are often subject to conflicts between data protection law and 
other legal obligations.”305 Nevertheless, the U.S. remains resolute in 
its refusal to pass comprehensive data privacy legislation.306 Following 
a series of headline-grabbing security breaches that exposed consumer 
personal information,307 federal agencies increased regulatory efforts, 
but Congress declined to pass omnibus privacy legislation that would 
unify the current regulatory patchwork.308  
While comprehensive federal legislation would go a long way in 
harmonizing fragmented privacy protections, most commentators 
agree that such an approach is unlikely in the near term.309 The 
unlikelihood stems in part from the characterization of privacy as an 
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individual rather than a societal interest.310 Americans view data 
privacy as a consumer problem, not a societal one, and the law has 
conformed to that characterization.311 Societal harms invoke an active 
governmental role to forestall harms like environmental degradation 
or infectious disease.312 The public interest is codified as legal norm, 
with government agencies promulgating standards and supervising 
their implementation.313 Reporting requirements, audits, and 
government investigations attend the protection of societal interests.314 
Government creates the legal norm, oversees its implementation, and 
actively enforces it.315  
By contrast, data privacy is viewed as an individual interest; 
injuries are treated as individual to the consumer only.316 If a rule or 
statute creates a legal obligation with regard to personal data, redress 
depends on the consumer recognizing it and seeking a legal remedy 
on her own.317 “Consumers assume a large responsibility for 
identifying their own injuries, policing the market by making 
informed decisions, and enforcing their rights, usually through 
litigation.”318  
This characterization of privacy as an individual interest that is 
protected if at all by the consumer’s pursuit of her own remedy dilutes 
the effectiveness of the data privacy laws in place today. A meaningful 
gap separates the gathering of personal data from its injurious use.319 
Several entities secretly track browser history and then sell the 
information.320 A visit to “NewYorkTimes.com” prompts dozens of 
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third parties to note and record the user’s visit.321 Indeed, a host of 
unidentified groups follow users as they navigate the web.322  
Users typically do not know they are being tracked, nor can they 
easily divine who is tracking and gathering their browsing history for 
later sale.323 Nor are users notified when that information is sold to a 
data broker or others.324 It may be years before the privacy harm 
manifests. A job application rejected based on the applicant’s 
browsing history obtained through a data broker illustrates the 
difficulty in regulating privacy through individualized enforcement. If 
data privacy is only protected when the consumer seeks redress, and 
if the consumer’s injury is dislocated from the privacy breach, the law 
offers little hope of meaningful data protection.  
To be fair, data privacy protection is not entirely up to the user 
alone. The FTC has prosecuted some entities based on data privacy.325 
The prosecutions, though, are relatively rare.326 The FTC lacks a clear 
privacy mandate.327 In the few instances where the FTC has prosecuted 
entities for data privacy violations, it has done so by leveraging the 
prohibition against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”328  
Importantly, the FTC’s primary legal argument stems from the 
defendant’s “deceptive” practice, which generally arises when the 
defendant fails to follow its own privacy policy.329 A company acts 
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deceptively when it publicly promises to not sell consumer data to 
third parties and then sells the data to third parties.330 In other words, 
enforcement actions brought by the FTC depend on entities (1) 
voluntarily instituting privacy policies, (2) publishing them, and then 
(3) failing to follow them.331 Prosecutions on this basis prompt the 
perverse incentive to adopt weak privacy policies or to foreswear them 
altogether. 
In summary, U.S. privacy law consists of a patchwork of 
industry-specific statutes that require user enforcement in addition to 
intermittent FTC enforcement of deceptive trade practices. It is 
unsurprising, then, that those entities that process personal data are 
often characterized as self-regulating.332 This is no accident, as the 
electronic commerce industry has moved to forestall government 
oversight by advocating for self-regulation.333 The Direct Marketing 
Association, for example, promulgates and promotes privacy 
guidelines and encourages members of the association to post a 
conspicuous notice on their respective websites notifying users of the 
entity’s data collection and retention practices.334 The credit card 
industry self-imposes encryption obligations and mandatory reporting 
for data breaches.335  
The Clinton Administration advocated industry self-regulation 
as the best means of protecting the personal privacy of online users 
without hobbling each industry with government interference, stating, 
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“[w]e believe that private efforts of industry working in cooperation 
with consumer groups are preferable to government regulation.”336 
Certainly, the market motivates electronic commerce companies to 
protect consumer data in many instances, but the effectiveness of 
market controls remains questionable, especially when privacy harms 
are latent.337 Professor Joel R. Reidenberg concluded that “self-
regulation is not an appropriate mechanism to achieve the protection 
of basic political rights.”338  
IV. REGULATORY PROPOSALS AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS 
The regulatory landscape, both domestically and abroad, fails to 
protect against data privacy harms. Government officials, privacy 
advocates, and academics have posited legal solutions, many of which 
would strengthen privacy protections but none of which fully 
contemplate the enormity, diversity, and granularity of data captured 
by the Internet of Things and leveraged by data brokers. Nor do these 
proposals tailor the regulatory restrictions to discrete privacy harms.  
For example, the FTC in its 2014 Report proposed new privacy 
protections, including support for a law aimed at data brokers.339 The 
proposed legislation would require brokers to give consumers access 
to their information once a year for free and allow consumers to then 
dispute inaccurate data, prompting an obligation on the part of the 
broker to verify accuracy.340 Over and above supporting the proposed 
legislation, the FTC recommended a requirement that consumers opt 
in before brokers could share “sensitive” data, like personal health 
information.341 Finally, the FTC recommended a disclosure provision, 
which would require that data brokers reveal their data sources and 
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that a website disclose a list of the largest data brokers as well as links 
to their opt-out policies.342 
Unlike the FTC’s recommendations, proposals from the 
corporate sector advocate market-based solutions.343 A pay-for-
privacy system, for example, would allow consumers to avoid data 
collection by paying extra, while offering discounts to consumers who 
consent to collection.344 A less structured approach to the same concept 
features businesses charging more for products with robust privacy 
controls without asking consumers to consent to data collection or 
providing notice of the same.345 
On the other end of the spectrum, a proposal billed as consumer-
friendly seeks to vest ownership of personal data in the consumer.346 
Sometimes called the “personal data economy,” this model houses a 
consumer’s personal data in a single digital location in order to allow 
the consumer to choose what data to share with specific entities and 
when.347  Such user-centric models purport to “empower[] consumers 
to extract value from their own data by, for instance, selling or 
providing access to their information to data [brokers].”348 
Even more proposals flow from academia. Professor Jack Balkin 
proposes a comprehensive framework that targets the computing and 
electronic communications industries.349 He posits a law that would 
impose a fiduciary obligation on commercial ISPs, search engines, 
email providers, and social media networks, among others.350 Each 
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such entity should carry a heightened duty to protect consumer data, 
not unlike the duties of loyalty and confidentiality owed by lawyers 
and doctors to their clients and patients.351  
In contrast to Balkin’s comprehensive approach, Professor Paul 
Ohm proposes a more narrow and practical model. Ohm attempts to 
identify the types of personal information that could do the most harm 
to consumers.352 By defining this “sensitive” personal data, the law 
could more aggressively protect it.353 Social security numbers, 
financial accounts, and medical information fall within this category, 
but Ohm argues for expanding it further to include precise geolocation 
information, communications metadata, and biometric data.354 
All of these proposals have weaknesses. The FTC’s emphasis on 
consumer access to data broker files for correction and the FTC’s 
emphasis on disclosing the sources used by data brokers to gather 
information do little to forestall privacy harms. They are primarily 
transparency measures. Nothing limits a broker’s ability to sell a 
consumer’s browsing history to a potential employer, insurer, or jilted 
lover, for example. The opt-out solution also leaves much to be 
desired. One intrepid reporter in 2014 documented her exhaustive 
attempt to opt-out from over 200 data brokers,355 which accounts for 
less than half of data brokers currently operating.356 
Similarly, market-based approaches like pay-for-privacy are 
unlikely to attract significant participation. But more importantly, 
such approaches commodify what many feel is a universal right to 
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privacy, not one enjoyed solely by those who can pay for it.357 
Academic proposals that would impose a fiduciary duty on the entities 
most likely to handle personal information or proposals to expand the 
scope of “sensitive” information suffer from definitional ambiguity 
and implementation difficulty.358 Each proposal continues to posture 
privacy harms as individual harms rather than societal ones. Each 
places the burden on consumers to police and enforce privacy 
infractions, an increasingly daunting task given the fluidity of digital 
information. No proposal adequately shields against discrete privacy 
injuries occasioned by granular data gleaned by the Internet of Things 
and aggregated by data brokers for sale on the open market.  
V. SOCIETAL HARM; SOCIETAL PROTECTION 
A. Societal Harm 
Injuries stemming from collection and misuse of personal data, 
if characterized as societal rather than individual, prompt legal reform 
fundamentally distinct from the current sectoral regime and distinct 
from the proposals posited by the FTC, experts, and academics. 
Societal harms, like environmental or healthcare harms, warrant 
proscriptive government involvement that emphasizes prevention 
over post-injury punishment.359 To forestall community or societal 
harms, government agencies prescribe regulatory norms, supervise 
their implementation, audit industry players, investigate potential 
infractions, and prosecute violators.360 Certainly, the communal harms 
occasioned by toxic waste leaching into groundwater or the outbreak 
of infectious disease are qualitatively different from pervasive 
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disclosure and misuse of personal data. But gravity of harm is not the 
gravamen of societal protection.361  
Professor James Nehf compared the justifications for societal 
protection from environmental harms with that of data privacy 
harms.362 Environmental harms warrant societal protections for six 
distinct reasons according to Nehf.363 First, environmental harms 
typically present an unavoidable risk shared across the community.364 
By living and sharing the same environment, we essentially shoulder 
equal risk.365 While mitigation through healthy living is possible, 
individuals ultimately lack control over environmental risks.366  
Second, the difficulty identifying an individual injury from an 
environmental abuse justifies societal protection.367 Environmental 
harms are often difficult or impossible to discover.368 Dumping trash 
in the ocean or disguising pollution emanating from cars eludes 
detection and prosecution by individuals.369 When discovered, injuries 
stemming from environmental contamination can be latent.370  
Third, proving causation for environmental injuries is 
difficult.371 “The source may be unknown, unknowable, or there may 
be many possible contributors so it is impossible to identify the 
perpetrator.”372 For example, it is impossible to identify the 
responsible parties for an individual’s loss of oceanfront property due 
to rising sea levels.373 Professor Nehf identifies three other factors 
justifying societal protection: the inadequacy of money damages from 
 
 361. See Nehf, supra note 1, at 74–76 (identifying six characteristics of 
societal problems). 
 362. See id. at 78.  
 363. See id. at 74. 
 364. See id. 
 365. See id.  
 366. See id. 
 367. See id. at 75. 
 368. See id. 
 369. See Margaret D. Fowler, Linking the Public Benefit to the Corporation: 
Blockchain as a Solution for Certification in an Age of “Do-Good” Business, 20 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 882–83 (2018) (discussing one of the most “infamous 
modern instances of fraud,” wherein “VW implanted a device in its vehicles to trick 
emissions tests, thereby selling cars that not only polluted up to forty times the amount 
of nitrogen oxide permissible under US regulations but also violated regulatory 
schemes of governments around the world”). 
 370. See Nehf, supra note 1, at 75. 
 371. See id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. See id. 
 Exposed 421 
environmental harms, externalities attending environmental harms, 
and the noneconomic value in preventing environmental harm.374  
He also applies these same factors to a car purchase, a 
landlord-tenant lease, and a dry cleaning agreement.375 These three 
transactions analyzed through the same six factors demonstrate their 
proper characterization as individual harms rather than societal 
harms.376 The risk of injury stemming from a defective car, by 
comparison, is not a universal or involuntary risk.377 Similarly, there is 
little difficulty identifying the individual harm stemming from a 
defective car, and proving causation is significantly easier.378 Money 
damages are traditionally adequate, and fewer externalities attend 
individual redress of harms stemming from the sale of a defective 
car.379  
Where does data privacy fall when applied to these six factors? 
According to Professor Nehf, harms stemming from the collection and 
misuse of diffuse personal data warrant characterization as a social 
harm:  
We are all equally at risk of injury from misuse of our data, and we cannot 
avoid the problem if we are to participate in modern society. Information 
about us is seemingly everywhere, and we can do little to minimize its 
collection and use. Except in the most egregious situations, harms resulting 
from information misuse may never be known to us. So much of our data is 
being shared every day, yet we have no idea what the ramifications may be 
(good or bad) or what decisions are being made in reliance on it. Even if we 
discover an injury from data sharing, tracing its cause to a particular 
information source or leak will likely be difficult, if not impossible. 
Obtaining effective redress will therefore be rare.380  
With regard to the last two factors, externalities and the 
noneconomic value in preventing the harm, data privacy has a less 
clear application.381 What is the noneconomic value in preventing data 
privacy harm, if any? This question finds exploration in literature 
more than the law.382 George Orwell is the most prominent figure to 
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fill that gap, with Big Brother cited to a saturation point in privacy 
writings.383 Knowing that Big Brother is constantly watching foments 
a stultifying and dystopian existence.384 Others refer to Jeremy 
Bentham’s “Panopticon,” a prison complex with glass cells all facing 
the watchtower.385 Every prisoner is fully exposed, thus reinforcing 
normative behavior through awareness of exposure.386 The Hawthorne 
Effect is similar, suggesting that behavior changes with awareness of 
surveillance.387 
The question is certainly open for debate. What is the extent of 
data privacy’s noneconomic value? Susan Greenfield, a neuroscientist 
and member of the British Parliament, identifies a more subtle 
noneconomic value in data privacy.388 “Every[body] seems to think 
that it’s great to be connected and exposed all the time. But what 
happens when everything is literal and visual? . . . The universe of the 
abstract is inexplicable. The nuance in life disappears.”389 
Even if data privacy lacks noneconomic value, the other factors 
categorize data privacy as a societal harm rather than an individual 
harm.390 As a result, the legal structure preventing that societal harm 
will be manifestly different from the current legal landscape and from 
the lion’s share of privacy proposals to date. 
B. Societal Protection 
Presuming that systematic dissolution of privacy occasions 
societal harm, and presuming that data privacy merits societal 
protection similar to that afforded to environmental concerns, what 
would societal protections look like? Importantly, societal protection 
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does not mean government monopoly. While government actors 
create regulations, supervise implementation, and ensure compliance 
through audits and investigations, individual remedies are not 
abandoned, and the open market continues to play a meaningful role 
for industry players. Identifying data privacy harms as societal merely 
boosts government involvement.  
That involvement begins with Congress enacting an enabling 
statute. The statute would create a federal agency, the Data Privacy 
Commission, responsible for the creation of data privacy regulations, 
the implementation of those regulations, and assuring compliance. To 
satisfy the nondelegation doctrine,391 the enabling statute should 
specify the Commission’s organizing principles and scope of 
authority. In particular, the statute should limit the Commission’s 
rulemaking authority to rules that specifically target identified data 
privacy injuries. In doing so, the Commission must weigh the 
likelihood of the privacy risk and gravity of the harm against the 
benefit to society absent regulation.392  
These guidelines require the Commission to both (1) tailor 
regulations to identified data privacy harms and (2) balance the gravity 
and likelihood of harm against societal benefit. Thus, the Commission 
would restrict the unauthorized use of personal data rather than its 
collection. For example, the Commission would differentiate the 
relatively innocuous collection of data by household objects 
comprising the Internet of Things from the aggregation and misuse of 
that data by a data broker.393 To severely restrict the mere collection of 
personal data would be to truncate the Internet of Things altogether. 
The societal benefits associated with automated garages, thermostats, 
and smart meters outweigh the privacy injury of mere collection. The 
privacy harm associated with collection is significantly mitigated if 
after-collection use is effectively restricted. 
The principles apply most dramatically to the data broker 
industry. This is so because data brokers facilitate the most severe 
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privacy harms.394 Harms include manipulating consumers by 
commercial interests, profiling consumers to the benefit of one 
category and detriment of another, profiling vulnerable consumers to 
facilitate third party exploitation, identity theft achieved by criminal 
clients purchasing detailed personal data, blackmail, and more.395 Data 
brokers act as catalysts for discrimination based on race, ethnicity, 
mental illness, gender, and sexual orientation.396 If the data itself is 
thirty percent inaccurate, the evils of profiling are compounded by the 
evils of erroneous profiling.397  
One recent article identifies a new injury enabled by data brokers 
called relational control: 
Relational control occurs when individuals acquire the private data of those 
in their social or professional networks. When data brokers sell consumer 
data to individuals, they allow buyers to learn about the behavior and 
motivations of those whose data they purchase. These insights allow the 
buyers to influence the decisions of those around them, leading to potential 
harms unrecognized by privacy scholarship to date.398 
The “aggregation principle” and de-anonymization algorithms 
exacerbate these harms.399 With regard to the former, a discrete data 
point on its own may be harmless, but when aggregated with 5,000 
other data points, the risk of harm multiplies.400 Anonymity likewise 
is increasingly illusory with larger and larger data sets.401 All told, the 
data broker industry threatens the widest variety and most egregious 
of privacy harms. 
There are, of course, benefits to the data broker industry, and the 
Commission would necessarily account for them before promulgating 
restrictions.402 Many clients pay data brokers to help manage risk.403 
Before lending large sums to a borrower, lenders require identity 
assurance and data assurance to prevent fraud.404 Moreover, a 
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significant swath of Americans favor customized marketing.405 
Targeted advertisements simplify shopping and even identify desired 
products that consumers would not otherwise know about.406 
Additionally, a myriad of scientific benefits attend big data.407 
Epidemics can be predicted based on aggregated search inquiries.408 
One study showed the evacuation patterns of a large community based 
on tracking cell phones, allowing officials to better plan for natural 
disasters.409 
In light of these harms and benefits, the Commission would be 
justified in restricting many of the uses to which data brokers employ 
the personal data they collect. The Commission could significantly 
restrict consumer profiling to forestall discrimination and exploitation. 
The Commission could limit data brokers’ clientele to specific pre-
certified entities or to entities operating in specific fields, thus 
reducing the likelihood of identity theft, relational harms, profiling, 
and societal stratification.  
To balance the benefits many see in direct marketing, the 
Commission could allow data brokers to sell consumer data to 
advertisers but only after observing explicit safeguards. Requiring that 
brokers maintain records of consumers’ informed written consent and 
requiring periodic confirmation of that consent ensures that consumers 
know and choose to allow targeted advertising based on their personal 
data. Contractual controls could limit brokers’ clients from using the 
information for any purpose other than that specified in the contract. 
The Commission could also require brokers and their clients to secure 
the personal data during use and to destroy it after.  
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With regard to the Internet of Things, the Commission would 
again focus on use rather than collection. Using personal data gleaned 
from a smart thermostat in order to increase the efficiency of that 
thermostat for that particular user poses minimal harm, if any. Selling 
the same information to a third party for unspecified uses poses more 
objectionable risks. Generally speaking, allowing the use of personal 
data to improve the product for the client’s continued use of the 
product likely benefits more than harms, especially if the client gave 
informed written consent.  
The Commission could very well conclude that the more 
significant threat posed by the Internet of Things is security.410 As 
noted above, ordinary objects connected to the web are often 
vulnerable to hacking.411 While the costs associated with requiring 
security measures for connected devices may be passed on to 
consumers, the Commission may find such costs outweighed by the 
privacy harms implicit in vulnerable devices, especially devices that 
lead to physical harm if hacked like cars, ovens, and traffic lights.412 
In short, the Commission could employ a spectrum of 
protections prompted by reducing risk of serious harm and tempered 
by societal benefit. One might question the likelihood of 
implementation when Congress has not enacted a national privacy law 
in ten years,413 even after a host of headlines that detailed digital 
hacking of major corporations and government agencies.414 American 
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governance, as contrasted to European governance, favors market 
controls and balks at excessive government intervention and 
regulation. Strong industry players—principally the data broker 
industry—would lobby intensively against such an approach. 
Consumers, while abstractly concerned about data privacy, have not 
witnessed the harms directly.  
But international pressure for comprehensive data privacy 
reform remains high. The E.U. has tipped the scales, setting a trend 
among developed countries toward enactment of national data privacy 
legislation.415 Moreover, use-based restrictions are not foreign to 
American jurisprudence. At least twenty-three states restrict the 
disclosure of motor vehicle records by prohibiting companies from 
using such information except for limited purposes such as identity 
verification or fraud prevention.416 Perhaps it will take a large-scale 
catastrophe to motivate voters and elected officials to view data 
privacy as a social harm worthy of social protection. After all, many 
scholars trace European devotion to privacy to Nazi exploitation of 
personal records allowing identification of Jews in occupied 
territory.417 
CONCLUSION 
Four components that meaningfully affect data privacy are just 
now coming into focus. When viewed together, they demonstrate the 
clear need for legal reform. First, the Internet of Things collects vastly 
more data than before.418 The data ranges from the mundane to the 
deeply sensitive.419 Much of it is gathered without user awareness, to 
say nothing of user consent.420 It is trending toward the ubiquitous and 
includes all manner of data exhaust.421  
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Second, the rise of data brokers has enabled the aggregation and 
analyzation of enormous amounts of user data.422 That data is collected 
from multiple sources but not from users directly.423 A gap separates 
the user from the harvesting of her data, allowing covert collection and 
abstracted accountability.424 Without user interaction, data brokers are 
shrouded from the public eye and individual users have little reason to 
suspect their data is systematically monitored, recorded, and sold.425  
Third, privacy harms are latent.426 Most users do not know that 
their purchase histories are recorded and transferred or that 
unidentified third parties follow them as they navigate the web.427 
From profiling to identity theft, the potential injuries are removed 
from the collection of the data enabling the injuries.428 Identity theft 
facilitated by the Internet of Things and data brokers may occur years 
after the personal data was gathered and sold.429  
Fourth, there are few legal protections in place. The data broker 
industry is largely self-regulated.430 Outside the data broker industry, 
sectoral privacy laws fail to account for the Internet of Things and 
restrict only one source among many.431 When data brokers “sell 
marketing lists identifying consumers who have addictions, AIDS and 
HIV, [and] genetic diseases,”432 and do so legally, they render HIPAA 
protections irrelevant. Indeed, several industry-specific laws predate 
the Internet, and almost all of them predate the tandem emergence of 
data brokers and the Internet of Things.433 
Viewed together, these four developments necessitate robust 
legal protection. Because the current legal landscape fails to protect 
against the several privacy harms now emerging, a host of proposals 
 
 422. See supra Part II. 
 423. See id. 
 424. See id. 
 425. See id. 
 426. See supra Part V. 
 427. See Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal 
Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 435 (2008) (“Much of the ‘privacy’ 
Americans have enjoyed results from the fact that it was simply too expensive or 
laborious to find out intimate data about them. In the twenty-first century, technology 
and law have combined to erode the protection for personal privacy previously 
afforded by practical obscurity.”).  
 428. See supra Part V. 
 429. See id. 
 430. See supra Part III. 
 431. See id. 
 432. FTC DATA BROKER REPORT, supra note 159, at 25 n.57.  
 433. See supra Part III. 
 Exposed 429 
attempt to address the problem.434 These proposals largely miss the 
mark.435 They envision privacy harms as individual and if at all 
redressable, only by the injured party.436 Data privacy harms, however, 
are usually latent and difficult to trace to the responsible entity.437  
In light of the difficulties inherent in individualized 
enforcement, the universality of the privacy threat, and the Internet’s 
borderless architecture, privacy harms are more appropriately 
characterized as a societal harm. As a result, societal protections, 
including the creation of a federal agency charged with rulemaking 
and enforcement authority, are warranted. Pervasive exposure 
demands societal protection.  
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